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The Specific Consumer Expectations Test for Product
Defects
CLAYTON J. MASTERMAN AND W. KIP VISCUSI**
The consumer expectations test in products liability law holds firms liable for
producing goods that are more dangerous than the reasonable consumer would
anticipate. But judicial experience in the majority of states that have utilized the
consumer expectations test demonstrates that it is ambiguous and impossible to
apply predictably. The test is ill-suited for regulating complex products or markets
with heterogeneous consumers; moreover, the test requires courts to expend
significant resources to identify consumers’ ex ante beliefs about product risks, even
when consumers lacked tangible beliefs about products at the time of purchase. The
other major test that courts apply to design defects, the risk-utility test, is also not
well defined. The several factors of the risk-utility test are difficult for courts to apply
consistently and permit courts to overrule the preferences of consumers who may be
willing to tolerate higher risks for lower prices.
In this Article, we propose that courts adopt an amended version of the consumer
expectations test that we call the “specific consumer expectations test.” The specific
consumer expectations test would apply to any product or product component for
which consumers have clear, articulable ex ante expectations about the function of
the product. Under the specific consumer expectations test, a defendant is liable if
consumers expected such a product to reduce a particular risk, and the product in
fact increased that risk. Similarly, if a product was intended to convey a particular
benefit, but in fact harmed consumers along the same dimension, the test is violated.
For example, if defective airbags increased the risk of injury after a motor-vehicle
crash rather than decreased the risk, that product would be deemed defective under
the specific consumer expectations test. By shifting the law’s focus from measuring
the magnitude of consumer expectations to a simpler identification of the direction
that consumers expected risks to change, the specific expectations test increases the
administrability of products liability law and captures most of the incentives that the
traditional consumer expectations test could theoretically provide. In particular,
firms are incentivized to produce products that never increase risks unexpectedly,
and consumers are empowered to purchase products which reflect their willingness
to pay for risks. In cases where consumers lack specific expectations, we argue that
courts should apply the risk-utility test to minimize unanticipated accident costs to
consumers and firms.
We bolster our analysis with a novel experiment that demonstrates that the
specific expectations test is consistent with the preferences of actual consumers. Our
incentive-compatible experiment asked subjects to make consumption decisions over
various risky products and determine punishments for the firms that manufacture
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defective products. The results reveal that individuals demand substantially greater
punishments for firms that manufacture products that violate specific expectations.
But, before the defect has manifested, consumers are willing to tolerate prospective
defect risks in general as well as defects that would cause a product to perform the
opposite of its intended function. It is after the defect has occurred that consumers
display greater outrage with respect to product defects that impose harms that are
the opposite of the intended function of the product or product component. Taken
together, these results indicate that the specific expectations test would deter
manufacturers from making defective products in the exact circumstances where
consumers suffer the greatest harms from product defects, and the test would permit
consumers to choose when to consume dangerous products without producers
risking ex post liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts determining whether a defendant manufactured and sold a defective
product have long struggled to coherently assign liability and punishments to
defendants. Modern products liability law is torn between two tests, each of which
envisions a different role for the courts in regulating markets. 1 The consumer

1. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1708–
1724 (2003) (discussing the debate between the risk-utility test and consumer expectations
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expectations test, under which a defendant is liable if they manufactured a product
that is “in a defective condition and dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics,” holds producers
strictly liable for products that pose risks beyond what consumers expected. 2 The
risk-utility test, under which a defendant is liable if “the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe,” employs a negligence-like framework. 3 State courts
have intermittently adopted either or both of these tests, leaving manufacturers and
consumers to navigate a fragmented legal landscape, particularly for nationally
marketed products.4
As one would expect, both the traditional consumer expectations test and the riskutility test have different merits. The consumer expectations test incentivizes
manufacturers to produce products that comport with consumer beliefs, reducing the
probability that consumers are exposed to risks they do not anticipate.5 But the scope
of the consumer expectations test is both potentially unlimited and not well defined.6
Because consumers generally do not have perfect foresight that a product defect will
occur, the definite occurrence of the unfavorable product outcome will be contrary
to general consumer expectations in almost all product defect situations.7 Do all such
unfavorable product outcomes trigger producer liability or must the defect constitute
a significant violation of consumer expectations? Perhaps the defect is not a complete
surprise, as in the case of the purchase of a used car model despite the existence of
well-known, highly publicized repair problems. The risk-utility alternative does not
fare much better; by divorcing liability from consumer perceptions, it theoretically
incentivizes firms to take efficient precautions but has proven difficult to implement
or predict.8 Moreover, it causes firms to choose how safe their products are by

test); see also Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 A.3d 1232, 1242 (Conn. 2016)
(“Under the ‘modified’ consumer expectation test, the jury would weigh the product’s risks
and utility and then inquire, in light of those factors, whether a ‘reasonable consumer would
consider the product design unreasonably dangerous.’”) (quoting Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic
Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997)); Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d
329, 352–53 (Ill. 2008) (holding that it may be appropriate to apply both the risk-utility test
and the consumer expectation test in the same case).
2. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
3. Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 990 N.E.2d 997, 1011 (Mass. 2013) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998)).
4. See Mike McWilliams & Margaret Smith, An Overview of the Legal Standard
Regarding Product Liability Design Defect Claims and a Fifty State Survey on the Applicable
Law in Each Jurisdiction, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 80, 83–90 (2015) (reviewing the applicable test
in each U.S. jurisdiction).
5. See infra Section II.B.
6. See infra Section II.C.
7. See Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Products Liability, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2457, 2490–92 (2013) (discussing the consumer expectations test’s tendency to find
liability too often).
8. See infra Sections I.C.
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anticipating what level of safety courts would expect, rather than the consumers who
actually purchase and consume the product.9
As an alternative to the morass that the traditional consumer expectations and the
risk-utility tests have created for manufacturers and consumers, this Article proposes
that courts adopt an altered consumer expectations test, which we call the “specific
consumer expectations test.” Under the specific consumer expectations test, a
defendant is liable for manufacturing a defective product if one or more attributes of
the product cause harm and serve the opposite of their intended purpose. Our test
would apply only to products over which consumers have specific expectations; all
other products would be subject to the risk-utility test which is the only major
alternative to the consumer expectations test. 10 To satisfy the specific consumer
expectations test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product or a component of the
product was intended to alleviate a particular risk of harm, and that the product was
defective in a manner that caused harm of the kind that the product or component
was intended to alleviate. For example, airbags that explode independent of any
accident and cause harm to the passenger clearly violate specific consumer
expectations, and a manufacturer of such airbags would be liable under the specific
expectations test.11 In contrast, cigarettes that cause smoking-related illnesses, such
as lung cancer and heart disease, would not violate the specific expectations test since
consumers do not generally believe that smoking cigarettes enhances health on these
dimensions.12
The impetus for our specific consumer expectations test is twofold. First, our
proposed test avoids many of the pitfalls of the existing consumer expectations test,
which we present and discuss in Part II. The goal of products liability law should be
to maximize the total economic welfare of consumers and producers of potentially
risky products.13 Such welfare is generally maximized by incentivizing firms to
create products consistent with consumer expectations, so that consumers can opt in
to risks that they are willing to assume and opt out of those risks they are not.14 Courts
applying the test must therefore be able to predictably identify product defects
presenting risks that consumers (1) are willing to assume when they know of such
risks, and (2) are averse to in the absence of specific risk information. Our test frames
the consumer expectations test in terms of specific aspects of product performance
that the consumer has reasons to believe the product will meet. Thus, the test does
not deal with aspects of product performance that might be entirely unanticipated but
instead focuses on the performance dimensions for which the product or attributes of

9. See W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 73–74 (1991) (arguing that it is
inappropriate for the preferences of courts to determine product safety levels when markets
are capable of assigning risks on the basis of consumer preferences).
10. See infra Section I.C. for a discussion of the risk-utility test.
11. E.g., Hiroko Tabuchi & Neal E. Boudette, Automakers Knew of Takata Airbag
Hazard
for
Years,
Suit
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/business/takata-airbags-automakers-class
-action.html?login=email&auth=login-email [https://perma.cc/M53V-Z2CC].
12. E.g., Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 990 N.E.2d 997, 1011 (Mass. 2013).
13. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2–3 (2004)
(discussing the use of social welfare in law and economics).
14. See infra Part II.
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the product were primarily intended.15 Reserving the specific consumer expectations
test for product dimensions that consumers have particular expectations over, while
reserving the risk-utility test for other aspects of product performance, makes
products liability law more predictable and contributes to its goals of enhancing
economic welfare.
Second, as we demonstrate using a novel experiment in Part III, reformulating the
test in the manner that we propose is consistent with strongly held consumer beliefs.
These original experimental results demonstrate that specific consumer expectations
are predictable, and that punishing firms that violate them is consistent with
consumer preferences. Consumers view defects that violate specific consumer
expectations as being much more blameworthy than comparable generic product
defects. Our experiment asked respondents two sets of questions. In the first, subjects
expressed preferences over products that presented a risk of defect, some of which
undermined the product’s primary purpose and others which did not. In the second
set of questions, subjects considered whether to punish a manufacturer that made
products that were defective in the same manner as the product that consumers had
just considered purchasing. The results indicate that consumers will shift their
expectations in response to direct information about a risk that a product will not
serve its intended purpose. But when subjects learn ex post that a harm has occurred
to other consumers without such knowledge, subjects exhibited moral outrage and a
desire to punish firms, consistent with an actionable violation of expectations.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development
of modern products liability law from its foundations to the current fragmented legal
landscape. The Sections explore the operation of the consumer expectation test and
risk-utility test, demonstrating the significant room for ambiguity in application. Part
II presents our analytic framework for evaluating the traditional consumer
expectations test, the specific expectations test, and the risk-utility test. We
demonstrate that the specific expectations test preserves producer incentives to
provide products that are consistent with consumer expectations and overcomes the
substantial weaknesses in the conventional consumer expectations test. Part III
presents our novel experiment, which demonstrates that consumers possess
detectable and predictable specific expectations, the violation of which consumers
see as meriting more severe punishment than product defects more generally. The
results demonstrate that our test captures social preferences for the operation of
products liability law.
I.

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Modern courts hearing a plaintiff’s claim that a defendant manufactured a
defective product generally apply one of two tests, or a combination thereof: the
consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test.16 This Part explores the evolution

15. See infra Section II.C., which argues that the unanticipated aspects of product
performance are a primary explanation for the failures of the traditional consumer expectations
test.
16. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Fansworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1220 (Alaska 1998)
(recognizing both tests); Ostendorf v. Clark Equip. Co., 122 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Ky. 2003)
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of products liability law over time and presents both of these common tests as courts
apply them today. Section A recounts the development of the law, tracing its path
from common law privity doctrines to the fractured jurisprudence of today. The
failure to reach a national consensus regarding the most pertinent test for product
defects is reflective of the current disarray in these products liability criteria. Section
B explores the consumer expectations test, which fifteen states apply exclusively. 17
The test, which resembles strict liability, focuses on whether a product presented
risks that an ordinary consumer would not expect. Section C explores the risk-utility
test, which eighteen states apply exclusively.18 The risk-utility test, which loosely
resembles ordinary negligence doctrine, focuses on whether a manufacturer could
have made the product safer without decreasing its usefulness. Nine states allow a
plaintiff to allege that a defendant is liable under either test.19 Finally, a small

(applying the risk-utility test); Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770, 774–76 (Okla.
1988) (applying the consumer expectations test).
17. Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
exclusively apply the consumer expectations test. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102(7)(A)
(2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-4-1 (West 2011); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.301(4) (2016); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8) (2012); Brown v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 328 F.3d 1274, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing Utah’s consumer expectation’s
test); Austin v. Lincoln Equip. Assocs., 888 F.2d 934, 936 (1st Cir. 1989); Delaney v. Deere
& Co., 999 P.2d 930, 945–47 (Kan. 2000); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145,
1152 (Md. 2002); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Neb. 2000);
Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1181 (N.H. 2001); Oklahoma,
Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770, 774–76 (Okla. 1988); McCathern v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 331 n.15 (Or. 2001); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 A.2d 110, 113–14 (Vt.
1975); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 739–41 (Wis. 2001); Sims v.
General Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357, 364–65 (Wyo. 1988); see also McWilliams & Smith,
supra note 4, at 83–85 (collecting references).
18. Alabama Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia exclusively apply the risk-utility test. ); Louisiana, LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.54 (2018); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 99B-6(A), (B), 99B11 (West 2011); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (LexisNexis 2017); Pennsylvania,
Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1042 (3rd Cir. 1997) (discussing Pennsylvania’s
risk-utility test); Minnesota, Ehlers v. Siemens Medical Solutions, USA, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 378,
383–384 (D. Minn. 2008); Flemister v. GMC, 723 So.2d 25, 27–28 (Ala. 1998); Camacho v.
Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246–47 (Colo. 1987); Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., 550
S.E.2d 101, 103–104 (Ga. 2001); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 306 (Idaho 1987);
Kentucky, Ostendorf v. Clark Equip. Co., 122 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Ky. 2003); Evans v. Lorillard
Tobacco Co., 990 N.E.2d 997, 1013–1014 (Mass. 2013); Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 538
N.W.2d 325, 333 (Mich. 1995); Jurado v. W. Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317–18 (N.J.
1993); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 62 (N.M. 1995); Scarangella v. Thomas
Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 681–682 (N.Y. 1999); Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701
S.E.2d 5, 14 (S.C. 2010); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tex.
1998); Beatty v. Ford Motor Co., 574 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 2002); see also McWilliams &
Smith, supra note 4, at 85–87 (collecting references).
19. Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, and
Washington recognize both tests. GMC v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1220 (Alaska 1998);
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minority of eight states apply tests that adopt elements of both tests, but do not
perfectly align with either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility test. 20
A. A Brief History of Products Liability Law
At the beginning of the twentieth century, tort law generally provided no remedy
when a product harmed the consumer who purchased it.21 Early courts reasoned that
a manufacturer did not generally owe a duty of care to third parties that it did not
transact with,22 and no claim for negligence could arise if a defendant did not owe
the plaintiff a duty of care.23 The requirement that a plaintiff consumer had privity of
contract with the defendant manufacturer precluded tort law remedies for harms that
defective products caused. In some cases, courts were willing to infer that a defendant
owed a duty to the public at large to prevent particularly dangerous products from
harming the public, but such cases were rare.24 In a particularly famous instance, the
court in Thomas v. Winchester found an apothecary liable after he mislabeled poison
he sold to distributors as medicine and buyers who consumed the poison were
injured.25 Other courts reasoned that a caterer who served “unwholesome” food
endangered the lives of event guests, just as if the caterer had administered poisonous
medicine.26 But outside of such dangerous product cases, tort law did little to
accommodate plaintiffs who sought a remedy against a manufacturer.
As a result, a suit for defective products could only arise under contract law. 27
Sometimes a contract for goods included an explicit warranty of merchantability, but
courts also proved generally willing to infer an implied warranty of merchantability,

Arizona, Golonka v. GMC, 65 P.3d 956, 962–63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Soule v. GMC, 882
P.2d 298, 308–09 (Cal. 1994); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 (Conn.
1997); Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Acoba v.
General Tire, Inc., 986 P.2d 288, 304 (Haw. 1999); Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d
249, 255 (Ill. 2007); Glenn v. Overhead Door Corp., 935 So. 2d 1074, 1081 (Miss. Ct. App.
2006); Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 971 P.2d 500, 504–05 (Wash. 1999); see also
McWilliams & Smith, supra note 4, at 87–88 (collecting references).
20. Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, South Dakota, and Virginia
each apply tests that differ from the traditional consumer expectations or risk-utility
formulations. Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 500 F.3d 691, 698 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the uncertainty over South Dakota’s law); Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 111
F.3d 1174, 1177 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing Virginia’s test); Allen v. IBM, No. 94-264-LON,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8016, at *139 (D. Del. May 19, 1997); Wright v. Brooke Grp. Ltd.,
652 N.W. 2d 159, 169–70 (Iowa 2002); Guiggey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me.
1992); Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 760 (Mo. 2011); Krueger v. GMC, 783
P.2d 1340, 1345 (Mont. 1989); Fyssakis v. Knight Equip. Corp., 826 P.2d 570, 572 (Nev.
1992); see also McWilliams & Smith, supra note 4, at 88–90 (collecting references).
21. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985).
22. E.g., Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 F. 400, 403–05 (7th Cir. 1894).
23. E.g., Singleton v. Felton, 101 F. 526, 528 (6th Cir. 1900).
24. See id.
25. 6 N.Y. 397, 397–98 (1852).
26. Bishop v. Weber, 1. N.E. 154, 154–55 (Mass. 1885).
27. See, e.g., Loxtercamp v. Lininger Implement Co., 125 N.W. 830, 831–32 (Iowa 1910).
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which worthless or dangerous products would violate as a matter of law.28 A
consumer could then bring a claim for breach against the seller if a product was
defective. But, plaintiffs could levy this claim against only their contractual
counterparty—the seller.29 In the many cases where the manufacturer and the final
seller were not the same entity, contract law enabled a cause of action only against
the seller. If the seller was judgment proof, then a plaintiff was without recourse;
strategic dealing by manufacturers could therefore render them generally immune to
liability for defective goods.30
But in 1916, the New York Court of Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
held that privity was not required to bring a claim in negligence against a
manufacturer of a dangerous product that was defective.31 Instead, MacPherson
extended the rule of Thomas v. Winchester to products “which, in their normal
operation, are implements of destruction.”32 Under MacPherson, a manufacturer of
any good that is “reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made” owed a duty of care to the public at large to not make the product
negligently.33 The class of products no longer subject to the privity rule grew
substantially. No longer limited to poisons and adulterated foods, plaintiffs brought
claims against the manufacturers of electric cranes,34 roads,35 stoves,36 and many
other goods that routinely posed a risk to consumers. MacPherson was a watershed
moment in the law of products liability; courts across the country and the
Restatement (First) of Torts subsequently adopted the no-privity rule in the decades
that followed.37
In the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the American Law Institute expanded upon
the notion of dangerous products from MacPherson and the Restatement (First).38
Comment i to section 402A provided the first articulation of the modern consumer
expectations test.39 Section 402A of the Second Restatement stated that a defendant
should be liable for selling “any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer.”40 Comment i clarified what kinds of risks were

28. E.g., Weed v. Dyer, 13 S.W. 592, 594 (Ark. 1890); Snowden v. Waterman, 28 S.E.
121, 121 (Ga. 1897); Nixa Canning Co. v. Lehmann-Higginson Grocer Co., 79 P. 141, 141
(Kan. 1905).
29. See, e.g., Weed, 13 S.W. at 594; Snowden v. Waterman, 28 S.E. 121, 121 (Ga. 1897);
Nixa Canning Co. v. Lehmann-Higginson Grocer Co., 79 P. 141, 141 (Kan. 1905).
30. Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE. L.J. 1, 14–37 (1996)
(discussing actions that defendants can take to become judgment proof and arguing that
judgment-proof defendants interfere with the operations of the tort system).
31. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
32. Id. at 1050.
33. Id. at 1053.
34. Payton’s Adm’r v. Childers Electric Co., 14 S.W.2d 208, 208–10 (Ky. 1929).
35. Harriman v. N.Y., Chi. & St. Louis R.R., 171 N.E. 686, 686 (N.Y. 1930).
36. Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., 195 N.W. 388, 389–91 (Wis. 1923).
37. E.g., Kalash v. L.A. Ladder Co., 34 P.2d 481, 482 (Cal. 1934); Carter v. Yardley &
Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 699–700 (Mass. 1946); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE §§
394–402 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 402A(1) (emphasis added).
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“unreasonably dangerous” to consumers; a product is “unreasonably dangerous”
only if it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics.”41 Thus, under the Restatement’s test, any
manufacturer that sold a defective product which violated ordinary consumer
expectations about its safety was strictly liable for any harm the product caused.42
And while it is unclear whether the Restatement precipitated state court adoption of
the consumer expectations test or merely predicted it, 43 it is undeniable that states
widely adopted the consumer expectations test in the years that followed. 44
Over time, some courts became dissatisfied with how the consumer expectations
test was practically applied.45 In particular, some courts questioned whether strict
liability remained an appropriate approach to products liability when courts could
balance the benefits and costs of alternative products, similar to the traditional
negligence analysis that courts had long engaged in.46 As a result, some courts
adopted what has become known as the “risk-utility” test for products liability. 47 As
discussed in Section C, the risk-utility test shifts the focus of products liability law
from the expectations of an ordinary consumer to whether an alternative product
which presents a better risk-benefit tradeoff existed. The pace of change remained
slow, however. Today, roughly even numbers of state courts apply the consumer
expectations test and the risk-utility test, though many states permit plaintiffs to make
their case under either test.48
B. The Consumer Expectations Test
In most states today, plaintiffs can successfully bring a products liability claim if
they demonstrate that the product violated consumer expectations.49 In particular,
plaintiffs will prevail if they show that a product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary and reasonable consumer would expect when the product is used in a
reasonably foreseeable manner.50 Courts apply the test in all manner of products

41. Id. at comment i.
42. Id. § 402A.
43. See Hylton, supra note 7, at 2467 (discussing the controversy over whether the ALI
adopted the strict liability theory prescriptively or descriptively).
44. E.g., Zaleskie v. Joyce, 333 A.2d 110, 113 (Vt. 1975); Vincer v. Esther Williams AllAluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 797–98 (Wis. 1975). Courts that apply both
tests split on how to determine whether liability attaches when the tests differ in result. Some
courts favor one test or the other, Gutterman v. Target Corp., 242 F. Supp. 3d 695, 706 (N.D.
Ill. 2017), while others will find a defendant liable if either test demonstrates a defendant was
liable, Zaleskie, 333 A.3d at 113.
45. See infra Part II, for an analysis of critiques of the ordinary consumer expectations
test.
46. David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 980
(2007).
47. E.g., Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673–74 (Ga. 1994).
48. McWilliams & Smith, supra note 4, at 83–85, 87–88.
49. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
50. Douse v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 314 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1251 (M.D. Fla. 2018); Show v. Ford
Motor Co., 697 F. Supp. 2d 975, 980–81 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
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liability cases, including manufacturing defects and design defects. 51 MacPherson’s
influence is still observable, though, as courts have applied the test to a variety of
products that could cause danger even though those products are not inherently
dangerous, including household goods,52 food and drink,53 and health care products.54
Whether a particular product violated the expectations of an ordinary and
reasonable consumer is a question of fact for the jury to decide.55 A plaintiff may
offer specific evidence of ordinary consumer expectations, but the jury can also rely
upon their own experience to determine what an ordinary consumer would expect. 56
Letting jurors draw on their own experiences is reasonable particularly because the
pool of jurors, made up of ordinary consumers, is better situated to define what an
ordinary consumer may expect than expert witnesses. But, when the plaintiff’s claim
involves technical information beyond the common knowledge and experience of
jurors, courts generally require a plaintiff to present expert testimony that
demonstrates the defect.57 For example, in Show v. Ford Motor Company, the court
considered whether a plaintiff’s claim that a vehicle rolled over too easily, rendering
it defective, could survive summary judgment. 58 The plaintiff had declined to proffer
any expert witness testimony about the car’s design. 59 Because consumers generally
lack articulable expectations about something as technical as a car frame, the court
reasoned that a jury was not well suited to draw on its own experiences and granted
summary judgment for the defendant.60
Because juries decide whether particular products are unreasonably defective,
court opinions rarely engage in a prolonged analysis about whether a particular
product violated consumer expectations.61 For example, in Brand v. Holmes Air
Taiwan, Inc., a court considered a motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim that a

51. E.g., Boy v. I.T.T. Grinnell Corp., 724 P.2d 612, 620 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (applying
the consumer expectations test to a manufacturing defect); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978) (applying the test to a design defect).
52. E.g., Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 418 (4th Cir. 1993) (step ladder
collapsed).
53. E.g., Gates v. Standard Brands Inc., 719 P.2d 130, 131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (candy
bar contained snake vertebrae).
54. E.g., Haddix v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 138 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1998) (fiber in
tampons caused Toxic Shock Syndrome).
55. Gutterman v. Target Corp., 242 F. Supp. 3d 695, 706 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“Typically,
application of the consumer-expectation test is a task for the jury, but it can be decided as a
matter of law where no reasonable jury could find that a product performed other than how an
ordinary consumer would expect.”) (citation omitted).
56. Show v. Ford Motor Co., 697 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
57. E.g., id. at 985.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 982.
60. Id. at 985–87.
61. See, e.g., Douse v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 314 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2018)
(“[The Complaint] alleges the entire Greenfield Filter was ‘subject to breakage, collapse,
migration, perforation, [and] causing thrombus.’ Taken as true, these allegations plausibly
support the contention that the Greenfield Filter was unreasonably dangerous because it was
more hazardous than the ordinary consumer would expect.”) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
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humidifier which burned the plaintiff’s child was defective under the consumer
expectations test.62 In one short paragraph, the court concluded that the ordinary
consumer would expect a humidifier to present a burn risk because “boiling water
produces steam” and “[h]ot water is an inherent property of a steam humidifier.”63
Likewise, in McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., the Supreme Court of Oregon spent
very little time evaluating the evidence that was presented to a jury.64 The plaintiff
demonstrated that the car at issue possessed less dynamic stability than what is
reasonably safe, and it therefore violated consumer expectations that a car would not
easily roll over in a collision.65 As a final example, in Gutterman v. Target Corp., the
court briefly noted that “an ordinary consumer would expect that riding a skateboard
in a retail store would create a risk of falling down from its use,” concluding that the
packaging for the skateboard was not defective because the packaging could be
removed and the skateboard ridden in the store.66
Courts disfavor finding for a plaintiff when the risk was open and obvious67 or
when the product warned consumers about the risk. 68 Some courts hold that an open
and obvious risk cannot violate consumer expectations as a matter of law because
any reasonable consumer would know or should know that such a risk exists. 69 For
example, in Davis v. Komatsu, a worker injured his hand when he placed it in an
industrial metal press to clear debris.70 The court reasoned that because the danger of
putting a hand inside of a 200-ton press was plainly obvious, the product was not
unreasonably dangerous and did not violate consumer expectations.71 But other
courts prefer to maintain a flexible consumer expectations test and hold that the
obviousness of a danger is simply one factor for courts to consider when determining
what consumers’ expectations were.72 Similarly, courts are hesitant to find that
products which establish consumer expectations through adequate warnings violated
consumer expectations unless the warning itself was inadequate.73 In Thongchoom v.
Graco Children’s Products, a plaintiff brought a claim alleging that a baby walker
was defectively designed when a baby placed in the walker navigated to a nearby tea
kettle, grabbed the cord, and was burned when the tea kettle fell. 74 The court noted
that the walker instructed users to never leave children unattended, to avoid

62. 500 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1044–45 (S.D. Ill. 2007).
63. Id. at 1047.
64. See 23 P.3d 320, 333 (Or. 2001).
65. Id. at 332–33.
66. 242 F. Supp. 3d 695, 707 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
67. E.g., Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 935–939, 946 (Kan. 2000) (rejecting
“open and obvious” danger test and recounting other cases in which Kansas Supreme Court
has rejected it).
68. Id. at 936–40 (rejecting adoption of a rule which would hold a product not defective
if it bore a warning label).
69. E.g., Austin v. Clark Equip. Co., 48 F.3d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1995).
70. Davis v. Komatsu Am. Indus. Corp., 46 F. Supp. 2d 745, 748 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
71. Id. at 753–54.
72. Delaney, 999 P.2d at 946.
73. See Thongchoom v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 71 P.3d 214, 218–19 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2003).
74. Id. at 216–17.
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appliances and hot surfaces, and that improper use could result in serious injury. 75
These warnings were sufficient to inform an ordinary consumer about the possibility
of injury.76
Another issue which has divided courts is the identity of the ordinary consumer.
In its canonical formulation, the test is an objective, rather than subjective, inquiry.
As a result, a plaintiff cannot prevail by demonstrating that a product violated the
plaintiff’s or any other identified group’s expectations; only the legally constructed
ordinary consumer’s expectations matter.77 Nevertheless, some courts reason that it
would be inappropriate to compensate a plaintiff who was aware of the risk that a
product presented.78 To illustrate, in Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., a plaintiff brought
a claim against the manufacturer of a bottle washing machine when the machine
caught the plaintiff’s pants and body as he leaned against the machine. 79 The plaintiff
testified that he was never personally warned about the risk that the machine posed.80
But because the court applied the objective formulation of the consumer expectation
test, it did not matter whether the plaintiff himself had been adequately warned—
what mattered was whether the danger itself was sufficiently obvious that a
reasonable consumer would expect the risk.81 Comparably, in Morton v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., a plaintiff sued an asbestos manufacturer once the plaintiff
was diagnosed with cancer attributable to asbestos exposure.82 On appeal, the
defendant argued that the scientific community’s uncertainty about the propensity of
asbestos to cause cancer should protect it from liability.83 Because the knowledge
and expectations of the reasonable consumer are key, not the knowledge of the
scientific community, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff. 84 In
contrast, in Magnuson v. Rupp Manufacturing, the court considered whether the
placement of a spark plug was a design defect that was unreasonably dangerous after
the plaintiff injured his knee by striking the spark plug. 85 Because the plaintiff was a
mechanic who knew the location of the spark plug and had removed and replaced it
several times, the court held that the product was not defective; actual knowledge of
the risk was sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. 86
C. The Risk-Utility Test
The risk-utility test is the major alternative to the consumer expectations test. The
canonical formulation of the risk-utility test is found in Section 2(b) of the

75. Id. at 218.
76. Id. at 219.
77. E.g., Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d. 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1974); Morton v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 25–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
78. See, e.g., Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 171 N.W.2d 201, 203–05 (Minn. 1969).
79. 499 F.2d at 191–92.
80. Id. at 194.
81. See id.
82. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22–23.
83. Id. at 25.
84. Id. at 25–26.
85. 171 N.W.2d at 203–05.
86. Id. at 207–08.
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Restatement (Third): Products Liability, which states that a product “is defective in
design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design,” and when the
“omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.” 87
Relevant factors for evaluating whether the foreseeable risks would have been
reduced by a reasonable alternative design include: (1) the usefulness of the product;
(2) the likelihood the product will cause injury and the seriousness of that injury; (3)
the availability of a safer alternative product; (4) the manufacturer’s ability to make
the product safer without impairing the utility of the product; (5) the user’s ability to
avoid danger through reasonable care; (6) the user’s awareness of the dangers
inherent in the product; and (7) the ability of the manufacturer to acquire insurance
or incorporate losses into the price of the good.88 Courts have widely incorporated
these factors, originally proposed by Dean Wade in his seminal article, into their riskutility analyses.89 Even in terms of their conceptualization, these factors involve
overlapping criteria and are not tantamount to a formal economic test of whether the
manufacturer was negligent.90
In practice, the risk-utility factors have proven difficult to interpret and
implement. The seven factors provide courts with several different product attributes
to consider, each of which imply a different appropriate response on the part of
courts.91 The test does not provide judges or jurors with a concrete way to compare
tradeoffs among the various factors—if a product is extremely useful but very likely
to cause serious injury, for example, it is not clear just how much utility is necessary
to offset a substantial safety risk.92 Fully informed consumers are capable of making
such determinations themselves, but the test requires that courts somehow impose an
aggregate decision on their behalf.93 Presumably, some level of utility is sufficient to
offset any level of risk, but the totality-of-the-circumstances test does not provide
courts with instructions on how to balance the disparate considerations the test
encompasses.94 The test also fails to address the fact that many of the factors are
interdependent and more appropriately determined by functioning markets than set
out by courts—the value of the product to consumers, for example, is itself a function
of the safer alternatives and how much reasonable care can reduce risks. 95

87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
88. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J.
825, 837–38 (1973) (laying out the “Wade” factors for the risk-utility test); see also Aaron D.
Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs:
The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1080–89 (2009) (reviewing the use of
these factors by each court that uses risk-utility).
89. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 88, at 1095; see also John W. Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
90. See VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 70–77.
91. Id. at 73.
92. Id. at 72–73.
93. Id. at 72.
94. Incommensurability of factors is a problem wherever the law does not provide a basis
for comparing different options. See Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability:
Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1998).
95. VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 73–74.
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The risk-utility test potentially resembles the general spirit of considerations that
would enter an economics negligence test by requiring manufacturers to implement
a safer design only to the extent that the safety benefits of the alternative design
outweigh the costs, including changes to product usefulness, price, and
manufacturing cost.96 This negligence-esque test sharply contrasts with the
conditional strict liability of consumer expectations.97 Under the consumer
expectations test, manufacturers are held liable for any product that exposes users to
a risk that an ordinary and reasonable consumer would not expect, but the risk-utility
test requires courts to assess the fault of the manufacturer by determining whether a
safer design of equal or greater utility existed. 98 The Restatement eschews formally
identifying the test as one of negligence, though courts have recognized the similarity
between classic negligence and risk-utility.99And of course, as in traditional
negligence and the consumer expectations test, whether the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design would have rendered a product reasonably safe is a question of
fact relegated to the jury to decide.100
Despite the formal dichotomy of the two tests, some jurisdictions blend the two
approaches. In some, courts apply the consumer expectations test but require
plaintiffs to demonstrate that a reasonable alternative design exists. 101 Others
augment the Wade factors in the risk-utility test with an analysis of whether the
average reasonable consumer would have expected a safer product.102 In both such
jurisdictions, courts claim that they are applying one test or the other, though they
have melded the two into one. Finally, some courts are far more transparent and
simply allow a plaintiff to show that a product was defective either because it violated
consumer expectations or because it does not satisfy the risk-utility test. 103
II. RESTRUCTURING THE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST
As the preceding Part highlighted, courts remain deeply divided over what test
should be used to evaluate products liability claims. Courts that switched to the riskutility test generally did so because the consumer expectations test proved
unmanageable and flawed in practice, and because the risk-utility test more clearly

96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(“Subsections (b) and (c), which impose liability for products that are defectively designed or
sold without adequate warnings or instructions and are thus not reasonably safe, achieve the
same general objectives as does liability predicated on negligence. The emphasis is on creating
incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and marketing
products.”).
97. See supra Section I.B.
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
99. See e.g., Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673–74 (1994) (“The balancing
test that forms the risk-utility analysis is thus consistent with Georgia law, which has long
applied negligence principles in making the determination whether a product was defectively
designed.”).
100. E.g., Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 335 (Pa. 2014).
101. E.g., Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1153 (Md. 2002).
102. E.g., Walker v. Macy’s Merch. Grp., Inc., 288 F. Supp. 3d 840, 858 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
103. E.g., Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457–58 (Cal. 1978).
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resembles the negligence test with which the courts are more familiar and
comfortable.104 But these reasons fail to address which test is likely, in practice, to
optimize social welfare. This Part addresses the critiques of the consumer
expectations test and concludes that it remains theoretically superior to the riskutility test. In particular, we conclude that the problems that the consumer
expectations test has faced in implementation do not doom it. Rather, the test needs
to be restructured to reflect both the underlying characteristics of consumer decisions
and judicial experience in the years since the test first entered the jurisprudence.
Section A presents the theoretical foundations of our analysis of the specific
consumer expectations test. We lay out a simple analytic framework for examining
consumer expectations, purchasing decisions, product safety, and the relevant rules
for products liability. Section B uses our framework to demonstrate that the
consumer expectations test is generally superior to the risk-utility test in establishing
incentives for manufacturers to create safe products. While the risk-utility test
induces firms to choose a risk level that minimizes the social harm from accidents, it
will also often cause consumers with flawed expectations to purchase goods they
would not have if they were aware of the risks the products presented. Section C
considers the operation of the consumer expectations test under our framework in
situations where courts have historically found the test lacking. We demonstrate that
our specific consumer expectations test improves the practical operation of the
consumer expectations test without sacrificing the incentives demonstrated in
Section B.
A. Conceptual Framework for Understanding Consumer Decisions
This Section presents the theoretical foundations of the specific consumer
expectations test. The theoretical model provides an analytically tractable framework
in which to compare the consumer expectations test and risk-utility test and evaluate
our proposed specific consumer expectations test.
Consider a hypothetical representative consumer who may purchase a potentially
risky product. Before taking any action, the consumer faces some baseline
probability 𝑝 of a bad outcome 𝑑, such as experiencing a car accident. 105 In reality,
consumers are exposed to myriad risks along multiple dimensions, but rather than
clutter our analysis with many parameters, we will assume consumers face only one
relevant risk. The assumption is not critical to our analysis but permits a simpler
exposition. The consumer can purchase a product which costs 𝑐 and provides a
consumption benefit 𝑏, such as the enjoyment and utility of driving a new car. In
addition to the consumption benefit, many products potentially increase or decrease
risks. Let 𝑝 represent the probability of a bad outcome that a consumer expects to
face if the product is purchased. If the consumer expects the probability of a bad

104. Cf. id. at 456 (augmenting the consumer expectations test with an early articulation of
the risk-utility factors to more adequately address product complexity and put the burden on
the manufacturer to establish the safety of a product).
105. To ease the exposition of our analytic model, we will consider a product that reduces
the risk of some bad outcome. The implications of our model and the specific expectation
test’s implementation are parallel if we consider a product that increases the likelihood of a
positive outcome.
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outcome is higher than the baseline probability, the utility benefit 𝑏 of the product
must be sufficient to warrant incurring the product cost. If the probability of the bad
outcome is less than the baseline probability, then the product confers both a utility
benefit as well as a safety benefit. Risk-neutral consumers106 will purchase the
product as long as the total benefits of purchasing the product, including both the
consumption benefit and the product’s expected tendency to reduce risks, exceed its
costs—or more specifically, if 𝑏 > 𝑐 + (𝑝 − 𝑝 )𝑑.107
To illustrate using a concrete example, consider a consumer who possesses a car
and is contemplating purchasing an aftermarket forward-collision warning system. 108
The consumer primarily uses the car to commute to work. During the commute, the
consumer faces approximately a 10% chance of experiencing a car accident in a
given year.109 The forward-collision warning system costs $1000110 and reduces the
probability that the consumer experiences a car accident by three percentage points
to 7% per year.111 Assume that a collision warning system provides no consumption
benefit and will not affect the severity of accidents if they occur, but it will affect the
financial cost of repairs.112 Then the consumer will purchase the forward-collision

106. In reality, many consumers are not risk-neutral; however, assuming risk-neutrality
simplifies our model and does not materially affect our analysis. In particular, the model could
be expanded to account for risk-averse consumers by adding a risk-premium or penalty term
to the purchasing condition which represents the consumer’s distaste for a risk. The premium
or penalty will generally be a function of the other parameters in the model. See generally HAL
R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 177–190 (3d. 1992) (discussing various functional
forms of risk aversion).
107. Without the product, the consumer’s payoff is −𝑝 𝑑. With the product, the
consumer’s payoff is 𝑏 − 𝑝 𝑑 − 𝑐. Consumers would therefore purchase the product if and
only if 𝑏 − 𝑝 𝑑 − 𝑐 > −𝑝 𝑑, or equivalently 𝑏 > 𝑐 + (𝑝 − 𝑝 )𝑑.
108. The availability of such after-market upgrades is discussed in Dee-Ann Durbin, Old
Car, New Tricks: Adding Safety Tech to an Older Car, USA TODAY (May 4, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2017/05/04/old-car-new-tricks
-adding-safety-tech-older-car/100976250/ [https://perma.cc/JMV3-X2YW].
109. The National Safety Council estimates that in 2017 approximately 24,800,000
vehicles were involved in crashes in the United States. National Safety Council, Injury Facts,
Overview, https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/motor-vehicle/overview/introduction/ [https://perma.cc/
U963-MNAV]. There were 225,346,257 licensed drivers in the United States in 2017. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF
HIGHWAY POLICE INFORMATION, Highway Statistics 2017: Licensed Drivers by Sex and Ratio
to Population, (December 2018), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2017
/dl1c.cfm [https://perma.cc/N23T-858G]. The implied probability of any driver being
involved in any car accident is 11%.
110. E.g., Safety Upgrades for Your Car: These Aftermarket Aids Can Help You Avoid an
Accident, CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 2013), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine
/2013/11/safety-upgrades-for-your-car/index.htm [https://perma.cc/7P3V-KTZA] (reviewing
an aftermarket forward crash detection system that costs $850 for the product and $150 to
install).
111. E.g., Durbin, supra note 108 (“Forward-collision warning systems, for example, can
reduce the risk of a crash by 27 percent . . . .”).
112. Of course, these assumptions could fail. If individuals experience mental comfort
from having an additional safety device, 𝑏 would be some positive value. Likewise, the
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warning system as long as he or she values a three percentage point reduction in car
accidents more than $1000. Depending on the consumer’s insurance policy, it’s quite
plausible that the forward-collision warning system is worth the cost.
In general, consumers’ expectations of risks will not perfectly correspond to the
actual risks that consumers face.113 Sometimes the information necessary to
determine the actual rate at which an adverse event occurs is unavailable to
consumers, such as when an airbag manufacturer does not disclose that their airbags
can explode and cause harm to drivers.114 Consumers may fail to aggregate risk
information because doing so requires technical knowledge that the average
consumer lacks.115 Finally, behavioral economics research demonstrates that the
average individual systematically overestimates small risks. 116 Let 𝑝 denote the true
probability of an adverse event occurring when the consumer purchases the product.
If 𝑝 is greater than 𝑝 , consumers will tend to purchase products more often than they
would have if they fully appreciated the risks associated with a product. In cases
where consumers overestimate risks, they will decline to purchase products that they
should have based on the consumption and risk-reduction benefits that the products
actually provide.
With this analytic framework, we can identify the decision rules that the
traditional consumer expectation test, our specific consumer expectations test, and
the risk-utility test establish. Of course, each of these decision rules are somewhat
stylized relative to their actual operation. As explored further in Section C, the way
that the traditional consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test deviate from
their economic formulation is a primary justification for our specific consumer
expectations test. Under the traditional consumer expectations test, a producer is
liable as long as their product presents a greater risk to consumers than consumers
expect.117 If the actual probability of harm 𝑝 is greater than consumer’s expected
probability of harm 𝑝 , the traditional consumer expectations test is violated and the
manufacturer will be liable for damages. Since courts generally focus on determining
liability and providing compensation to those who have suffered injuries, and courts

device could cause average crash speeds to decrease, thereby decreasing the probable harm
when an accident occurs. If these conditions persist, the consumer would be willing to pay
an even higher price for the product.
113. E.g., Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Mark Layman & Barbara
Combs, Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING
& MEMORY 551, 556–57 (1978) (showing that individuals overestimate risks due to causes
that are easy to imagine).
114. See, e.g., Tabuchi & Boudette, supra note 11 (discussing Takata’s knowledge of its
defective airbags).
115. See generally Athanasios Krystallis, Lynn Frewer, Gene Rowe, Julie Houghton, Olga
Kehagia, & Toula Perrea, A Perceptual Divide? Consumer and Expert Attitudes to Food Risk
Management in Europe, 9 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 407 (2007) (discussing the differences in
risk perception between consumers and individuals who measure health risks of food).
116. Lichtenstein et al., supra note 113, at 556–67; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors,
Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 131–33 (2001)
(demonstrating that jury-eligible citizens do not properly perceive risks, particularly in the
context of low-probability events in negligence cases).
117. See supra Section I.B.
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have historically been uneasy awarding probabilistic damages, 118 the measure of
damages in the case of liability will be the full level of injury that a particular injured
plaintiff sustained 𝑑.119 Under our specific consumer expectations test, a firm is liable
for a defective product that consumers expected would reduce a risk, but the product
in fact increased the risk. In other words, the plaintiff prevails if they can demonstrate
that the risk consumers expect to face is less than the baseline risk and the actual risk
that consumers who purchased the product face is greater than the base risk. The first
condition corresponds to our requirement that the product be one which consumers
expect to reduce the particular risk. The second condition corresponds to our
requirement that the product actually increased risk, contrary to the specific
expectations identified in the first condition. Depending on the products involved, a
plaintiff could demonstrate that the product increased the risk relative to the baseline
with a variety of evidence, including scientific studies, analysis of the mechanical
properties of the allegedly defective product, or surveys of the experiences of a large
sample of consumers. Consistent with traditional tort principles, plaintiffs will
generally need to demonstrate that they had suffered injury before a court will award
damages. As with the traditional consumer expectations test, actually injured
plaintiffs will receive 𝑑 in damages.
Under economic formulations of the risk-utility test, a producer is liable if there
exists some alternative product design with a different consumption benefit, risk
profile, price, and manufacturing cost such that the alternative product is safer and
still at least as preferable to consumers. Using the parameters defined above and an
“a” to denote the characteristics of the alternative product, the risk utility test would
be violated if 𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑝 𝑑 ≥ 𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑝𝑑. In practice, the risk-utility test is not a
formal benefit-cost analysis that perfectly tracks the formula, though the essence of
the test tries to approximate one.120 Two specific cases of alternative products

118. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1319
(2013) (discussing the hesitancy of courts to award probabilistic damages in many settings).
119. Courts that provide full damages to all plaintiffs who sustain an injury will
overcompensate plaintiffs as a class and overcharge defendants when a product increases the
probability of a risk rather than exposing consumers to a new risk, because 𝑝𝑑 > (𝑝 − 𝑝 )𝑑.
As a result, it is appropriate for courts to probabilistically reduce damages. See, e.g., Doll v.
Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1205–06 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the “inescapably probabilistic
character of many injuries,” and discussing the propriety of awarding 25% of full damages
when a defendant increased the probability of a bad outcome by 25 percentage points); see
also, United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (“The fundamental
principle of damages is to restore the injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he
would have been in had it not been for the wrong of the other party.”).
120. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 721 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Illinois
courts consider a broad range of factors in their risk-utility analysis, including the magnitude
and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm; . . . the nature and strength of consumer
expectations regarding the product, including expectations arising from product portrayal and
marketing; the likely effects of any alternative designs on production costs; and conformity
with industry standards, voluntary organization guidelines, and government regulation.”). The
relationship between the risk-utility test’s economic formulation and the courts’ articulated
totality-of-the-circumstances approach is similar to the relationship between the Hand formula
and the rule for negligence in torts. Cf. McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557
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deserve note here. If there exists an alternative design that is safer, provides the same
consumption benefit, costs the same to manufacture, and would be priced the
same,121 the product fails the risk-utility test. Defined in this manner, the risk-utility
test requires firms to manufacture products which are Pareto-efficient. 122 In other
words, a safety-related aspect of the product cannot be improved without increasing
the price or manufacturing cost or decreasing the benefit of the product. Next, there
always exists at least one “alternative product,” which is no product at all.123 If the
risks of the relevant product are such that consumers would be better off without
consuming the product at all, then the product may inherently fail the risk-utility test.
But, note that if consumers were perfectly informed about the risk of products, such
a product could never exist because consumers would never buy it. 124
This analytic framework suggests that the specific consumer expectations test
depends on informational components that are quite similar to the regular consumer
expectations test. Courts and juries must still acquire information about consumer
risk expectations, actual risks, and baseline risks to determine whether a product is
defective. But each of the three tests we discuss causes manufacturers to choose
different levels of product risk as a function of consumer beliefs, which we explore
in Section B.

(7th Cir. 1987) (“Illinois courts do not cite the Hand Formula but instead define negligence as
failure to use reasonable care . . . . But as this is a distinction without a substantive difference,
we have not hesitated to use the Hand Formula in cases governed by Illinois law.”). However,
the application of the risk-utility test in practice is substantially less precise than its parallel in
negligence. See generally VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 70–77 (discussing the difficulty of applying
the risk-utility factors).
121. Of course, consumer willingness to pay for products increases with perceived safety,
and so such an improvement in the product will often yield a higher price. E.g., Ana M. Angulo
& José M. Gil, Risk Perception and Consumer Willingness to Pay for Certified Beef in Spain,
18 FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 1106, 1109 (2007) (demonstrating that consumer
willingness to pay for beef is increasing in the perceived safety of beef). But if consumers
choose whether to purchase goods based on their expectations rather than actual safety, an
increase in safety may not allow firms to charge a higher price.
122. Pareto efficiency requires resources to be allocated in a manner such that no actor can
be made better off without leaving another actor worse off. See Gabrielle Gayer, Itzhak Gilboa,
Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler, Pareto Efficiency with Different Beliefs, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. S151, S157–59 (2014).
123. Some legal scholars criticize the use of the “null product” as a potential alternative
design. See Kim D. Larsen, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design
Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 Colum L. Rev. 2045, 2061 (1984) (discussing the use of
risk utility to determine whether a product can be marketed with any feasible design). Because
consumers possess heterogeneous risk preferences, it is probably generally preferable to
permit consumers to decide how much they are willing to pay for a certain risk-benefit tradeoff
through functioning markets rather than having courts impose preferences on markets. See
VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 73 (“In a democratic society, courts should not be engaged in
deciding for the public that some products (such as recreation equipment) are not useful or
essential. We can rely on effective markets, when they exist, to establish the appropriate
values.”).
123. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The expression 𝑏 > 𝑐 + (𝑝 − 𝑝 )𝑑
implies that −𝑝 𝑑 is in fact less than 𝑏 − 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑐.
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B. Producer Incentives
The two extant liability tests and our specific consumer expectations test
incentivize manufacturers to provide goods with different levels of safety under
different levels of consumer expectations. This Section reviews the equilibrium
behavior of manufacturers under each of the three tests, arguing that the tests based
on consumer expectations provide better incentives for manufacturers.
At the outset, it will be helpful to have a specific definition of what constitutes an
efficient level of product safety. The efficient level of product safety will be the
safety level that maximizes the benefit that consumers get from products they
consume minus the price they pay (the consumer surplus), plus the benefit that
manufacturers receive from the products they produce minus the cost they pay to
produce such goods (the producer surplus).125 This total economic welfare standard
ensures that courts value the consumption benefits that individuals derive from
product markets, the safety of consumers, and the profits of firms that make products.
The socially optimal level of product risk 𝑝∗ is the one where the marginal social
benefit of an additional unit of precaution is precisely equal to the marginal social
cost of such care. By construction, if products were any safer, the additional cost to
firms to manufacture such products would outweigh the benefits that consumers
receive from the safety; identically, if products were any riskier, the harm to
consumers from those risks would outweigh the saved costs of producers.126
The traditional consumer expectations test incentivizes producers to take care that
is either consistent with consumer expectations or at the efficient level. Assume that
manufacturers know consumer expectations with certainty and can perfectly price
discriminate.127 As a result, producers will always charge the highest price that
consumers are willing to pay, and we can focus on what level of risk manufacturers
will choose. Consider a firm subject to the consumer expectations test. If the firm
produces a product that poses greater risks than consumer expectations, its expected
profits are its revenues minus costs and the expected damages it will pay upon being

125. This “total surplus” standard is the standard metric for social welfare in law and
economics analysis. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 2–4 (discussing measures of welfare
in economic analysis). While it is possible to construct a different measure of social welfare
(such as a weighted measure of consumer and producer welfare), it may be preferable to
maximize total welfare first and pursue distributive policies later. See id. at 3 (noting that the
income tax system is generally better for pursuing redistributive goals than changing rules of
liability). However, some legal doctrines (like antitrust law’s rule of reason) explicitly
embrace a more consumer welfare-focused standard. See Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust
Need to Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 155, 156–57 (2007) (discussing the consumer
welfare standard of antitrust law and its distributive consequences).
126. Cf. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of
Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189–90 (1995) (arguing that the efficient level
of care is independent of income levels because redistribution is achieved through other means
and tort law should generally focus on minimizing net-accident costs).
127. A firm can price discriminate if it can charge different customers different prices. A
“perfect” price discriminator is capable of charging all consumers exactly what they are
willing to pay, so that firm profits correspond perfectly with total social welfare. See Hal R.
Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 870, 870–71 (1985).
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sued.128 If the firm produces a product which is at least as safe as consumer
expectations, its expected profits are revenues minus costs, but it no longer faces a
risk of damages. Because care is costly, profit-maximizing firms will never produce
a product which is even safer than consumer expectations, as doing so merely
increases production costs without changing consumer demand (which is dictated by
consumer expectations).129 In cases where the efficient level of product risk is riskier
than the level of risk that consumers expect, firms will produce products that are safer
than the efficient level, at a level consistent with consumer expectations. If
consumers expect products safer than the efficient level, firms will manufacture
products that are as safe as consumer expectations until consumers expect products
so safe that it is cheaper to produce at the efficiently safe level and pay damages to
injured plaintiffs. Firms switch from producing products consistent with consumer
expectations to the efficient level when consumers expect products so safe that the
cost of producing efficient products, including the expected damages that will be
paid, is less than the cost of producing products consistent with consumer
expectations.
Our specific expectations test provides substantially similar incentives to
manufacturers as the consumer expectations test. As in the situation of a firm under
the traditional consumer expectations test that produces a product as safe as
consumers expect, the expected profits of a firm that produces a product which is
expected to increase safety and actually does so are its revenue minus the costs of
producing the safety-increasing product. A firm producing a safety-increasing
product under the specific expectations test will take the bare minimum level of care
necessary to ensure that its products do not increase the risk of harm that consumers
face.130 But if a product actually increases risks relative to ex ante levels, the firms’
expected profits are its revenues minus costs and the damages that it will pay to each
injured plaintiff. Firms producing a good that violates specific expectations will
therefore produce at the efficient level of care because they minimize the expected
damages they face. If taking the level of care necessary to prevent products from
increasing the level of harm facing consumers is cheaper than paying damages and
taking the efficient level of care, firms will do so and meet specific consumer
expectations. The primary difference between firm behavior under the specific
expectations test and the traditional consumer expectations test is the level of care
firms take. The specific expectations test incentivizes products that do not increase
risks relative to the baseline of the particular class of risks (the level that consumers
would experience in the absence of purchasing the product), while the traditional
consumer expectations test incentivizes firms to produce at current levels of
consumer expectations.
The risk-utility test causes manufacturers to produce goods which have the
efficient level of risk, regardless of consumer expectations. Under the economic
formulation of the risk-utility test presented in Section A, firms will be liable if there

128. The firm will also face legal fees, but we assume these away for expositional reasons.
Our analysis accommodates legal expenses by subtracting expected expenses from profits.
129. Cf. VARIAN, supra note 106, at 63, A13 (proving that profit maximization requires
minimizing costs).
130. As in the consumer expectation test, this follows from the profit-maximizing nature
of the firm.
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existed an alternative product with a superior risk-cost tradeoff. The risk-utility rule
therefore requires firms to take care until the marginal benefit of additional care is
exceeded by its cost—by definition, the efficient level of risk. Firm profits are
therefore increasing in care until the efficient level, at which point the firm only loses
money by taking more care.
In sum, the consumer expectations test incentivizes firms to produce products that
are consistent with consumer expectations, unless consumers expect extremely safe
products, at which point firms produce efficiently safe products. The specific
consumer expectations test incentivizes firms to produce goods that are no riskier
than the baseline risk, except in the peculiar but possible case when the efficient level
of risk is actually sufficiently greater than the baseline level. The risk-utility test
incentivizes firms to produce products that are efficiently safe, always.
However, if the applicable products liability rule incentivizes firms to take the
socially efficient level of care, it does not follow that the rule has optimized behavior.
The divergence arises because consumers choose whether to purchase goods based
on their expectations, not the actual level of risk to which a product exposes them. 131
As a result, if firms produce a product with an actual risk that exceeds the expected
risk, consumers will purchase a product believing it to be safe enough to be worth
purchasing, when in fact the product exposes them to risks so large they would not
have purchased the product if they knew about the risks. The consumer expectations
test minimizes the quantity of consumers who purchase goods that they would not
want by providing goods that are consistent with consumer expectations except when
expectations are extremely low. The specific consumer expectations test narrows the
framing of this assessment and is based on whether the product increases a risk that
it was supposed to decrease. The risk-utility test, on the other hand, maximizes the
quantity of consumers who purchase goods that they would not have purchased if
they were perfectly informed by making the firm’s production decision completely
independent of consumer expectations.
Deciding between the traditional consumer expectations tests and the risk-utility
test therefore requires weighing the harm to consumers from increased accidents
versus the harm to consumers from mistaken purchases. Determining whether
inappropriate purchases or increased accidents harm consumers more will depend on
a variety of product-specific factors, particularly the baseline risk that consumers
face, the risk that a firm actually chooses, and the efficient level of risk. Balancing
these competing interests ex ante will depend upon consumers’ preferences for the
products liability system. Ex ante, we hypothesize that consumers are willing to
surrender marginal gains in safety in favor of not purchasing products that actually
increase the risks that they face contrary to their expectations.132 Our experiment in

131. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text for a discussion of why expectations
and observed risks may differ.
132. Cf. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484, 1536 (1998) (discussing loss aversion and
its legal relevance).
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Part III explicitly tests for social preferences of consumers in an analogous
situation.133
The consumer expectations and specific consumer expectations tests will
therefore be preferable to the risk-utility test in situations where consumers prefer to
limit the losses from mistakenly purchasing goods. If consumer expectations for all
product ramifications were well identified, the consumer expectations test would
have a potential advantage over the specific expectations test, as it often eliminates
the divergence between expectations and actual risk, while specific expectations
merely limits it. But the traditional consumer expectations test is not well defined
and has proven unworkable in courts in a way that prevents the generation of the
market benefits the test ought to provide. As we explore in the next Section, focusing
on specific expectations addresses the inherent shortcomings of the consumer
expectations test.
C. Overcoming the Weaknesses of Consumer Expectations
Almost since the Restatement (Second) of Torts introduced the consumer
expectations test, commentators have criticized it.134 The conceptual model from
Sections II.A and II.B provides a suitable framework to analyze the weaknesses in
the consumer expectations test that judicial experience has revealed. In this Section,
we identify three major problems with the test as it exists today. First, in the case of
complex products, consumers rarely have clearly articulable expectations over every
product dimension. Second, when different groups of consumers possess very
different safety expectations, courts may struggle to coherently assign liability.
Third, the traditional consumer expectations test is administratively burdensome
upon courts. This Section considers each of these weaknesses in turn, demonstrating
how the specific expectations test overcomes the problems that consumer
expectations has in each case.
1. Complex Products and Unknown Risks
The consumer expectations test has proven poorly situated to address the risks
that complex products present. By “complex products,” we mean any product that is
sufficiently complicated—by virtue of the product’s large number of parts or the
technical nature of the product’s manufacture—such that consumers lack clearly
articulable expectations about the performance of every dimension of the product.
For example, a car has approximately 30,000 different parts.135 An ideal consumer
considering buying a new car would possess risk beliefs 𝑝 , 𝑝 , … 𝑝 , for these
30,000 parts, which they balance against the benefit of the car, the risks they face
without the new car (a vector with a potentially arbitrarily large number of risks
attributable to the alternative to purchasing a car), and the harm that the consumer

133. We find that our experimental subjects do in fact prefer to punish firms which produce
products that violated specific expectations, while avoiding purchasing products with risks
they are unwilling to tolerate. See infra Section III.B.
134. Kysar, supra note 1, at 1702–03.
135. How Many Parts is Each Car Made of?, TOYOTA: CHILD. QUESTION ROOM
https://www.toyota.co.jp/en/kids/faq/d/01/04/ [https://perma.cc/8ZQN-2UUL].
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would experience if such risks manifest. It is impossible that consumers have clearly
articulable risk beliefs and preferences regarding the potential harm caused by failure
of each of those parts; it is more likely that consumers have a general expectation
that specified constellations of parts will accomplish their intended purpose.
Consumers collapse the 30,000 different risk beliefs into a single parameter 𝑝 (or a
smaller collection of beliefs attributable to sets of car parts) which corresponds to
their aggregate belief about the risk of the product.136
But if a single part in a complex product fails and causes injury, the consumer
expectations test requires the factfinder to convert the unitary and general
expectations that consumers actually used to make their decision into risk beliefs
over individual parts, particularly the part that failed, even though consumers never
actually held such beliefs. In practice, this process nearly universally finds a
defendant liable for the unobservable risks of a complex product. 137 Judicial practice,
as a result, forces jurors to reverse engineer expectations for complex products and
to decide that consumers expect products to be completely safe from unknown risks,
even in cases where the general type of risk is completely foreseeable. The normal
consumer expectations test therefore incentivizes manufacturers to make extreme
investments in safety for each individual part of complex products that is particularly
likely to be the subject of litigation. But more likely is that firms will not be able to
predict which of many parts will be subject to litigation; as a result, the ambiguity
over parts will dampen incentives to make specific improvements in product
quality.138
Our proposed specific consumer expectations test avoids reverse engineering
consumer expectations. Because the first step of the test is to identify whether
consumers had a specific expectation that the product or component would reduce a
particular risk, jurors would not be required to determine what consumers expected
of particular products that few consumers devote any actual thought to during their
decision process. Rather, jurors must determine whether the nature of the product
itself creates a specific expectation that a risk would be reduced. If so, then jurors
need only determine whether the product increased a risk that consumers expected
would be decreased. In cases where consumers lack specific expectations, courts
should employ risk-utility analysis to determine whether a more efficient alternative
product existed. This approach incentivizes firms to produce products at the level of
safety that consumers expect in cases where consumers have clear expectations over
complex products, and to produce efficiently safe products under the risk-utility test
in cases where expectations are not clear. Thus, consumer misinformation is less

136. Consumers may adopt a variety of different processes to collapse overwhelming
information into manageable chunks, including focusing on well-known or understood
parameters or fixating on the most salient characteristic. Cf. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the
Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH.
U.L.Q. 417, 437–43 (2003) (reviewing the consequences of information overload and the
heuristics that individuals employ to avoid it).
137. Hylton, supra note 7, at 2491–92.
138. See supra Section II.B. If firms do not know whether particular safety investments are
likely to reduce the risk of liability, they will be substantially less likely to take such safety
investments and will instead accept that they are likely to be found liable for damages.
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likely to result in consumer harm, and when it does the consumer harm is minimized
because the firms have been incentivized to do so by the residual risk-utility test.
2. The Amorphous Nature of the Test
The traditional consumer expectations test is amorphous.139 The test requires
factfinders to identify reasonable consumer expectations about the performance of
the product, but what constitutes “reasonable consumer expectations” is vague.
Without more content, the standard does little to guide any decisionmaker.140 The
ambiguity of the consumer expectations test makes it difficult for manufacturers to
predict liability ex ante. If a manufacturer does not know what risk consumers expect
or what courts will conclude that the consumer expected, their ability to tailor the
risk of their product to consumer expectations is lessened. Even in the simplest case,
where there are two possible levels of consumer expectations 𝑝 and 𝑝 , the
consumer expectations test yields poor results. Firms will choose to produce goods
consistent with the level of consumer expectations that maximizes expected profits,
including the expected risk of liability. Producing at the safer of the two levels of
consumer expectations will be safer but will yield higher manufacturing costs.
Producing at the riskier of the two levels will expose the manufacturer to a risk of
liability, which will only manifest if consumers actually expect products at the safer
level. Firms will likely choose to produce products at the riskier potential level of
consumer expectations, as doing so maximizes expected profits except when there is
a sufficiently large likelihood that consumers expect the safer risk level. But ex post,
if consumers actually expect products that are safer than the high level of risk
selected by the firm, such consumers will suffer harm from having purchased goods
that are riskier than expected. Thus, ambiguity in the test prevents the productsliability system from accomplishing its goals of compensating consumers who are
harmed by defective products and incentivizing manufacturers to create efficiently
safe products. Under such a system, different manufacturers’ idiosyncratic beliefs
about the expectations of their consumers will determine the level of precaution each
firm takes, rather than court-calibrated incentives that encourage efficient levels of
safety.
A related issue is the consumer expectations test’s inability to predictably manage
heterogeneous consumer beliefs. The test’s ambiguity is compounded in situations
where consumers may have sharply divergent expectations for the safety of a given
product.141 Other than the amorphous “reasonable person,” a jury has no guidance as
to whose expectations matter for determining liability. 142 If a particular group of
consumers expects products that are perfectly safe (𝑝 = 0), and another group
expects products that are efficiently safe (𝑝 = 𝑝∗ , the level which minimizes the total

139. See supra Section I.B.
140. See Hylton, supra note 7, at 2491 (“The consumer expectations test depends on a
determination—specifically, the expectation of the consumer—that the producer may not be
able to predict with any reasonable degree of accuracy at the time of production.”).
141. Hylton, supra note 7, at 2490.
142. Cf. Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 816–21 (2001) (discussing
the contours of the reasonable person standard in torts).
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social cost of product accidents), liability will be a function of which jurors happen
to get selected, rather than any aggregate measure of consumer preferences.
Heterogeneous consumer beliefs and uncertain consumer beliefs are very similar
problems for the firm and the products liability system. In both cases, there is some
ex ante probability that a jury hearing a lawsuit against the defendant manufacturer
would determine that consumers expected products at a given level of safety, and
some residual probability that consumers expected another level of safety. As a
result, rational firms will behave in this situation much the same as in the case where
consumer expectations are hard to decipher. Firms will be guided by the expected
chance of liability for each potential level of consumer expectations, and they will
choose to produce at the level that maximizes their expected profits. Because care is
costly, firms will favor less safe levels until the probability of damages is sufficiently
high to justify increasing the level of safety. But such a situation results in liability
being determined not necessarily by clear legal standards that firms should follow,
but by the lottery of which jurors get selected. Clarity of legal outcomes increases
the likelihood that the incentives of products liability are not dampened.
In the case of our specific consumer expectations test, the failure of product
performance is with respect to a dimension that is known to consumers and indeed
the product fails to perform in the opposite of the intended manner. When the product
fails to perform on some dimension in the opposite of the intended manner, there is
no ambiguity with respect to whether reasonable consumer expectations are being
met. In a broad variety of cases, manufacturers may have a difficult time identifying
ex ante whether consumers have some risk expectation 𝑝 or 𝑝 , but it will be simple
to identify whether 𝑝 and 𝑝 are greater than, less than, or equal to the baseline risk
𝑝 . As a result, manufacturers can identify the level of risk that is consistent with
consumers’ specific risk expectations. In the case of products that are meant to
increase the probability of a good outcome happening, the result is analogous. Firms
can more easily identify whether consumers expect a benefit and produce products
that will not cause a harm on that dimension.
3. Legal Administrability
The most straightforward benefit of the specific consumer expectations test is
saved judicial resources. Whereas under the traditional consumer expectations test,
a decisionmaker needs to determine three factors to decide liability—the precise
level of risk consumers face without the product, the precise level of risk consumers
face with the product, and consumers’ expectations of the level of risk they would
face with the product—our test enables a liability determination if the decisionmaker
knows whether a product should have reduced a particular kind of risk and whether
the product actually increased the risk. Such binary conditions are significantly easier
to identify. Testimony from plaintiffs or similarly situated consumers will be
sufficient to establish whether they expected the product to increase or decrease a
particular risk. Often the marketing of the product and the product’s attributes make
the direction of the purported effect clear as, for example, safety devices should
decrease rather than increase risks. The direction of the risk change will also often
be easy to detect; certainly, it will require less testimony than establishing the precise
magnitude of the risk change.
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Simpler legal tests will be better whenever the increased error costs from less
effective behavioral incentives are smaller than the saved administrative costs. 143
While many of these benefits and costs are difficult to quantify and compare in the
abstract, the saved administrative costs will be substantial. Jurors will likely be able
to determine the major factual elements of the test—whether the product was
expected to reduce a risk and whether it actually did so—without extended expert
testimony.144 Reducing the expected costs attributable to expert testimony and other
legal costs will also result in classes of harmed plaintiffs keeping larger portions of
their damages awards, contributing to the goal of products liability law of making
injured plaintiffs whole. Finally, if the fundamental elements determining liability
are easier, thereby increasing or decreasing the ex ante probability of plaintiffs
prevailing, it is more likely that cases will be disposed of earlier, either by motions
to dismiss, summary judgment, or settlement.145
In sum, the specific expectations test provides several analytic advantages over
the more familiar consumer expectations test. It provides firms incentives to produce
products that serve their intended purposes. It is substantially easier to apply than the
consumer expectations test; in particular, it coherently determines liability for
defective complex products and is easier to articulate and apply. To assess whether
the specific consumer expectations test does align with consumer preferences
regarding the structure of the liability regime, we fielded a novel experiment which
we present and discuss in Part III.
III. AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF SPECIFIC CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
In addition to the analytic superiority of the specific consumer expectations test
that we demonstrated in Part II, our specific expectations test reflects the way that
consumers actually value product risks and consider purchasing products. This Part
presents our experimental evidence that individuals prefer to punish firms that
produce products that violate specific expectations. Section III.A lays out the
methodology of our experiment that we used to test whether the specific consumer
expectations test aligns with consumer preferences. We designed an incentivecompatible146 experiment to test whether individuals’ attribute-specific expectations

143. Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal:
Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 115 PENN ST.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (discussing the role of error costs in evaluating legal rules); Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 596–99 (1992) (comparing
the utility of rules and standards based on how easy they are to apply and potential error costs).
144. While expert testimony is not formally required in consumer expectation or riskutility based products liability claims, such testimony is practically required when ordinary
knowledge is insufficient to detect a defect. E.g., In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.
Supp. 3d 304, 310–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
145. Cf. Jeffrey M. Perloff, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Paul Ruud, Antitrust Settlements and
Trial Outcomes, 78 REV. ECON. & STATS. 401, 405–07 (1996) (finding that the lawsuits that
plaintiffs are more likely to win are more likely to result in settlement).
146. A survey is incentive-compatible if it provides subjects with financial incentives to
reveal their true preferences. E.g., Ronald G. Cummings, Glenn W. Harrison & E. Elisabet
Rutström, Homegrown Values and Hypothetical Surveys: Is the Dichotomous Choice
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(1) react rationally to known risks and (2) accurately predict whether individuals
believe punishment is appropriate. In Section III.B, we present our results. We find
that our experimental subjects appropriately incorporated known risks into their
attribute-specific expectations. But, when facing hypothetical scenarios where
consumers did not know about product risks, our subjects sought to punish only those
products that violated specific expectations.
A. Experiment Design and Hypotheses
To investigate how individuals respond to defective products with attributespecific and other risks, we constructed an incentive-compatible survey that asked
respondents to express preferences between alternative risky products. Our sample
consisted of 128 undergraduate students recruited on campus at Vanderbilt
University. Student samples are common in experimental research in law and
economics.147 Random assignment of treatment and control groups ensure that our
results are internally valid even if the preferences of students are systematically
different from those of the population at large with respect to their preferences over
defective products.148 Appendix Table 1 provides summary statistics for our
experiment sample.149 Each of our scenarios revolved around car parts and
accessories. We chose car parts because virtually all subjects would be familiar with
these common (and commonly faulty) products.150 Additionally, car parts—subject
to regulation and fines from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA)—provide a well-defined legal framework to use in testing subjects’
preferences.151

Approach Incentive-Compatible?, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 260, 260–61 (1995). Our instrument is
incentive compatible because we endow our subjects with a budget and ask them to make
consumption decisions which have a real impact on that budget. If a subject purchases a car
part in our experiment for $2.00, their payout at the end of the experiment will be $2.00 lower.
If they choose to purchase a riskier car part for a lower price, the transactional setup ensures
that their willingness to accept a risk-price trade off reflects their authentic preferences.
147. E.g., Michele Belot, Raymond Duch & Luis Miller, A Comprehensive Comparison of
Students and Non-Students in Classic Experimental Games, 113 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 26,
26–27 (2015); David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract
Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 416 (2013).
148. See generally Arthur Schram, Artificiality: The Tension Between Internal and
External Validity in Economic Experiments, 12 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 225, 226–27 (2005)
(discussing the tradeoff between internal and external validity in economic experiments).
149. Regressions that explicitly control for our subjects’ characteristics do not materially
differ from the results that we present here.
150. As of 2017, there were approximately eight registered cars in the United States for
every ten individuals (272,480,899 cars for 325 million people). See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
Number
of
U.S.
Aircraft,
Vehicles,
Vessels,
and
Other
Conveyances,
https://www.bts.gov/content/number-us-aircraft-vehicles-vessels-and-other-conveyances
[https://perma.cc/64CR-M9X9].
151. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to
Collaboration and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON
REG. 167, 172–73 (2017) (describing the evolution of traffic safety regulation since 1966).
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Our study presented subjects with two types of scenarios: (1) product choices and
(2) manufacturer evaluations and punishments. Subjects answered questions
concerning five car parts and accessories: airbags, seatbelts, an autopilot system, air
conditioning, and gas caps. We chose these five car parts because most individuals
are familiar with each of them and because they have salient potential defects that
we could utilize.152 The order of products was randomized among subjects.153 Within
product type, subjects always answered a product choice question immediately
followed by a manufacturer evaluation and punishment question. The product choice
questions occurred first because these questions were individually incentivecompatible and previous research demonstrates that incentive-compatible questions
have spillover effects on other questions, causing subjects to take more care on all
questions in an experiment.154
1. Product Choice Scenario Design
Subjects received a starting balance of $15.00 and were told they would receive
their remaining balance at the end of the survey. We informed them that the survey
would ask them to make multiple purchasing decisions between two car parts and
that we would deduct the price of the product they purchased from their balance. 155
Additionally, we informed subjects that some of the products had a risk of defect and
that, if the product they purchased was actually defective, the cost of the defect would
also be deducted from their balance. The scenarios specified the risk of a product
defect and the cost of the defect. The prices and other features of each question were
calibrated so that the average subject earned approximately $12.00 over the course
of the experiment, which took subjects approximately twenty-five minutes to
complete.
The product choice scenarios asked subjects to choose between one of two
possible car parts. The first product always had some risk of defect while the second
part did not. To illustrate, an exemplary scenario describing a choice between airbag
models is provided in Figure 1.

152. Some of those defects have been the subject of recent recalls or media attention. E.g.,
Nathan Bomey, Uber Self-Driving Car Crash: Vehicle Detected Arizona Pedestrian 6 Seconds
Before Accident, USA TODAY, (May 24, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars
/2018/05/24/uber-self-driving-car-crash-ntsb-investigation/640123002/ [https://perma.cc/
NH8Q-5SL9]; Takata Recall Spotlight, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/takata-recall-spotlight [https://perma.cc/NE2G-3JBH].
153. If questions are always answered in the same order, then it is impossible to distinguish
between “order effects,” such as subject learning or changing their preferences during
participation and the actual effect of interest. See Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk
Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data Without Order Effects, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 902,
902–03 (2005) (discussing how order effects may influence previous estimates of individual
risk aversion).
154. E.g., Todd L. Cherry, Thomas D. Crocker & Jason F. Shogren, Rationality Spillovers,
45 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 63, 70–76 (2003).
155. Deducting the price of a product from subjects’ balance is a common method for
creating incentive compatibility. E.g., Julie R. Irwin, Gary H. McClelland, Michael McKee,
William D. Schulze & N. Elizabeth Norden, Payoff Dominance vs. Cognitive Transparency
in Decision Making, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 272, 273–74 (1998).
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Figure 1: Product Choice Example Scenario

The primary experimental treatment for each product-choice question was
whether the defect present in the risky product caused a risk of harm the product was
intended to prevent or whether the harm was unrelated to the function of the product.
Such a product would violate our specific consumer expectations test as long as
consumers did not expect such a risk to exist. We isolated the effect of such defects
on consumer decisions by endowing all products with a risk of defect and comparing
consumer responses across defect types.
Table 1 presents each version of each product that subjects faced. Each subject
was randomly assigned to see either a defect that caused a product to perform
opposite its intended function or a defect unrelated to the intended purpose of the
product. We randomly determined which version of the product the subject saw
separately for each of the five products. Independent assignment across products
allowed us to test for the effect of defect type both between and within subjects.156

156. For a discussion of the merits of “between-” versus “within-” subject designs in
experiments, see Gary Charness, Uri Gneezy & Michael A. Kuhn, Experimental Methods:
Between-Subject and Within-Subject Design, 81 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 3–5 (2012). Our
experiment presents little risk of confounding results by treating and not treating the same
individual across different questions because all of the questions are of a similar form and we
randomize question order among participants. As a result, our within-subject design permits a
more precise estimate of the effect of our treatment versus control. See id. at 6.
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Table 1: Summary of Product Defect Scenarios
Defects related to product
purpose
“In the case of a defect, Airbag A
pops and propels small pieces of
shrapnel toward the driver or
passenger. The medical bills from
the additional injures will cost
[x].”

Defects unrelated to product
purpose
“In the case of a defect, Airbag
A has faulty wiring which
causes the car’s check engine
light to remain on. Repairing
the faulty wiring costs [x].”

Autopilot

“In the case of a defect, Model
A’s sensors cannot detect other
cars and will get into a low-speed
rear-end collision at the first
opportunity for such an accident.
The damage from such a collision
will cost [x].”

“In the case of a defect, Model
A will burn more fuel. The
additional fuel costs are [x].”

Seatbelt

“In the case of a defect, the
seatbelt will not unlock following
a car accident, trapping the
individual wearing the seatbelt in
the car until the seatbelt is cut.
Suppose that individuals in a
typical car accident who are
wearing a seatbelt that prevents an
individual from leaving the car
will spend [x] in additional
medical bills.”

“In the case of a defect, the
seatbelt will not adjust
properly and is uncomfortable
to use. Users must pay [x] in
repair costs to adjust the
tension.”

Air
conditioning
refrigerant

“In the case of a defect,
Refrigerant A will cause your car
to constantly blow hot air. The
discomfort from the hot air is
equivalent to losing [x].”

“In the case of a defect,
Refrigerant A will cause an
unpleasant
odor.
The
discomfort from the odor is
equivalent to losing [x].”

Gas cap

“In the case of a defect, Gas Cap
A will not seal properly, causing
your car to lose a small amount of
gasoline. Such gasoline loss
presents no risk of personal injury
or property damage, but will
cause you to spend [x] more on
gasoline.”

“In the case of a defect, Gas
Cap A does not tighten
properly and causes the car’s
check engine light to turn on. A
defective gas cap will cause
you to spend [x] to diagnose
and repair the issue.”

Product
Airbag

Note: Each entry in the table is the actual language from the experiment
describing the product defect.
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In addition to randomly assigning the defect type, we randomly assigned the price,
defect probability, and cost of defect for the risky product in each question. The price
was between $0.50 and $0.90, which we varied at five-cent increments. The price of
the nonrisky second car part was fixed at $1.00. The risk of a defect was randomly
set at 10%, 20%, or 30%. The amount of money that the subject would lose if the
risky car part was defective was set between $1.25 and $1.75 at five-cent increments.
We chose these values so that the ex ante expected cost of both products would equal
$1.00. Upon random assignment of the various parameters, subjects faced risky
products with expected costs that ranged from $0.625 to $1.425. As a result, we
observe subject choices when the risky products have an expected cost above, below,
and equal to the risk-free product. After subjects made their choice, a random number
generator determined whether the purchased product was defective. The price of the
selected product and any applicable defect cost were deducted from the subject’s
balance.
In summary, the subjects engaged in an incentivized experiment in which they
had a choice between purchasing a higher priced safe product or incurring a lower
price for a potentially risky product that could generate a financial penalty. In
addition to the incentivized experimental structure, embedded in the experimental
design are three types of consistency tests for which it is feasible to do across-subject
comparisons. Subjects should be less likely to buy a given product if either the price
of the product is increased, the probability of harm is increased, or the magnitude of
the harm is increased.157 Using ordinary least squares regression, we find that each
of the expected relationships hold, indicating that our subjects demonstrated
consistent preferences and reacted rationally to financial incentives in our study. 158
But our initial analyses also reveal that subjects did not view the five products as
interchangeable financial lotteries. Subjects were much more likely to choose a risky
gas cap than a risky seatbelt, for example.159 Consistent with aversion, subjects chose
a safe product in 59.2% of their choices.
2. Manufacturer Evaluation and Punishment
After the product choice scenarios, the survey asked subjects to evaluate a
company that produced defective car parts with identical qualities to the risky

157. Similar tests are widely used in the experimental economics literature to demonstrate
that the subjects of an experiment exhibited rational preferences. See, e.g., Vivien Foster &
Susana Mourato, Testing for Consistency in Contingent Ranking Experiments, 44 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 309 (2002) (developing a set of tests for determining whether survey
responses are logical).
158. In a regression controlling for defect type, product type, product price, defect cost,
defect probability, and subject fixed effects, the estimated effects of product price, defect
cost, and defect probability are in the expected direction and highly statistically significant
(𝑝 < 0.01). A price increase of five cents made a subject five percentage points less likely to
select the risky product. A similar increase in the defect cost is associated with a 1.5
percentage point decrease in the probability of choosing the risky product. A 10 percentage
point increase in the risk of defect decreased the probability of selecting the risky product by
14 percentage points.
159. See infra Section III.B.3.
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product in the scenario they just completed. The first portion presented subjects with
a description of a company and asked them to indicate their agreement with several
statements about the company on a five-point Likert scale. Figure 2 presents an
exemplary scenario describing a company producing defective airbags.
Figure 2: Manufacturer Evaluation Example Scenario

The proportion of cars affected was set to match the probability of a defect in the
first scenario. Otherwise, all quantities were constant across scenarios.
The three judgmental statements in Figure 2 drew on several of the factors that
NHTSA is required to consider when determining the size of a penalty to levy against
a manufacturer of defective car parts. Federal law requires that NHTSA consider: (1)
“the nature of the defect;” (2) the manufacturer’s knowledge of its legal obligations
under federal law; (3) “the severity of the risk of injury;” (4) “the occurrence or
absence of injury;” (5) the number of vehicles affected; (6) actions taken to mitigate
the defect; (7) the size of the firm; (8) whether penalties had been levied against the
company within the last 5 years; and (9) “other appropriate factors.”160 Some of these
factors were difficult to evaluate in the context of our survey, while others we

160. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(c)(1)–(9) (2012).
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modified to avoid needlessly complicating the vignette we presented to subjects.
Consequently, we chose to evaluate the factors addressing severity, quantity of
affected cars, and the sufficiency of the manufacturer’s preventative actions.
Immediately after the question soliciting agreement with the statements (and on
the same screen) we asked subjects to assign a regulatory penalty to punish the
company. The mechanism for eliciting a penalty was a slider with responses ranging
from 0 to 20 in thousands of dollars.161 This scale is reflective of the statutory
NHTSA penalty schedule, which after recent inflation adjustments, ranges from $0
to $21,000 per safety violation. The slider started at the 0 position, and subjects could
provide no fine at all. The survey reminded subjects that NHTSA had already fined
the manufacturer to provide compensation for the harms so these penalties were
exclusively punitive.162 Figure 3 presents an exemplary regulatory fine question. The
slider started at the 0 position, and subjects could provide no fine at all.
Figure 3: Manufacturer Fine Example

The second stage of our experiment, in which we asked subjects their preferences
over punishments, did not provide subjects with incentives to choose particular
punishments. We did not incentivize the second stage of each product’s question
because we wanted to capture as closely as possible the real world setting in which
individuals choose punishments for others; judges, juries, and agency
decisionmakers cannot generally be incentivized to levy higher or lower
punishments.163 Likewise, other changes between the first and second stages of our

161. Sliders have been used in a variety of contexts to elicit subject preferences over an
interval. For example, David G. Rand, George E. Newman & Owen M. Wurzbacher, Social
Context and the Dynamics of Cooperative Choice, 28 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 159 (2015),
used a slider to elicit contributions in a public goods experiment, and Cade McCall, Nikolaus
Steinbeis, Matthieu Ricard & Tania Singer, Compassion Mediators Show Less Anger, Less
Punishment, and More Compensation of Victims in Response to Fairness Violations, 8
FRONTIERS BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2014), used a slider to elicit levels of costly punishment.
162. Subjects assigned a penalty of $0 thirty-two times. They assigned the maximum
penalty of $20,000 seventeen times. The modal penalty (108 responses) was $1000,
demonstrating that the quantity of harm to consumers remained a salient anchor even after
subjects knew consumers had been compensated.
163. Financially interested judges and juries violate due process. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927) (“But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a
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experiment (such as evaluating risks ahead of a decision or knowing that people were
already harmed) were designed to reflect authentic punishment decisions.
After subjects answered the product choice and manufacturer punishment
questions for each of the five products, the survey asked respondents to complete a
lottery choice game that measures a survey respondent’s individual level of risk
aversion.164 The survey concluded with a few questions about subjects’ personal
characteristics.165 The survey administrators paid the subjects in cash immediately
upon finishing the experiment.
3. Hypothesis
Ultimately, the experiment seeks to determine whether the specific consumer
expectations test (1) channels consumer attitudes about manufacturers that make
risky products in a fashion that incentivizes manufacturers to create products
consistent with consumer expectations, (2) is applied predictably in courts, and (3)
is not excessively costly to apply. The experiment was designed to test three central
hypotheses critical to the validity of our specific expectations test along these
dimensions.
Our first hypothesis, which was tested using subject responses to the questions
regarding punishment levels, is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Subjects will assign higher penalties to firms that
manufactured defects which violate specific expectations, even after
consumers have been compensated for direct harms.
Hypothesis 1 must hold true in order for our specific expectations test to be an
adequate substitute for the traditional consumer expectations test. As discussed in
Section II.C, jurors directing their outrage that a component of a complex product
which consumers implicitly expected absolute safety from is a primary cause of the
failure of the traditional test. Thus, the specific expectations test will only be an
adequate alternative if subjects want to punish violations of specific expectations
more than generic defects. If Hypothesis 1 holds true, it demonstrates that defects
that cause a product to work contrary to their specific purpose violate consumer
expectations in a different fashion than ordinary defects and that our test is adequate
to identify such defects.
Our second hypothesis addresses the questions measuring subjects’ evaluations
of companies manufacturing defective products. These questions test whether
differences in punishments are accompanied by negative views towards company
behavior. Our second hypothesis is as follows:

defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the
judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest
in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”).
164. Our questions measuring risk aversion were the same as used in Charles A. Holt &
Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644, 1645 (2002).
165. These questions provided the information presented in Appendix Table 1.
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Hypothesis 2: Subjects will have more negative views toward companies
that manufacture products that violate specific expectations.
Previous research demonstrates that outrage is a key component of punishment
decisions.166 If betraying specific expectations causes significantly more outrage than
other defective products, it confirms that consumers view these types of defects as
different. If the costs to consumers from these defects exceed their pecuniary values,
it justifies some separate treatment which our specific expectations test provides. As
an ancillary benefit, because the legal factors used to determine punitive fines for
defective products include nonobjective “evaluative” statements, the questions we
use to evaluate Hypothesis 2 also allow us to evaluate the prevailing regulatory
regime’s ability to address violations of specific consumer expectations.
Our final hypothesis tests whether consumers’ decisions to consume risky goods
is responsive to information about the magnitude and type of risk they face.
Hypothesis 3: Subjects will not distinguish between defects that cause
products to serve the opposite of their intended purpose when subjects
have been informed of the risks that goods pose ex ante.
In particular, we test whether consumers are less likely to purchase goods that
have a potential defect that is contrary to the primary purpose of the product when
the risk is fully expected. If consumers do not shy away from such defects more than
others, it indicates that consumers rationally incorporate information into their
specific expectations, even though they expect products to serve their intended
purpose in the absence of such information. A corollary of Hypothesis 3 is that
subject attitudes are independent of the type of product at issue—that consumers are
averse to a product causing harm that the product is intended to prevent regardless
of the type of product that is involved.
B. Experiment Results
1. Manufacturer Penalties
The experiment results provide strong support for our first hypothesis,
demonstrating that consumers care much more about defects that violate specific
expectations rather than general defects. Figure 4 presents the average fine that
subjects assigned to manufacturers in all products as well as each of the five product
categories separately. The lighter bars indicate the average penalty assigned to
manufacturers of products that violated specific expectations, while the darker bars
indicate the average penalty assigned to manufacturers of products that did not
violate specific expectations.

166. Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 60 (1998)
(showing a substantial correlation between the outrage a subject expresses and the level of
punishment levied).
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Figure 4: Mean Penalty Assigned to Manufacturers by Product

Note: N = 640 for all products, N = 128 for individual products. Brackets indicate the 95%
confidence interval for the average penalty assigned.

The average subject assigned a $4420 penalty to products that violated specific
consumer expectations (such as airbags that cause worse accidents and air
conditioning that blows hot hair). In contrast, the average penalty for products which
did not violate specific expectations (airbags with faulty wiring and air conditioning
with an unpleasant smell) amounted only to $2711. The $1709 difference (relative to
the mean when specific expectations were not violated) was highly statistically
significant.167 The effect was largest in the seatbelt scenario, where the penalty for
violations of specific expectations was $2827 larger (a 93% increase).168 Across all
scenarios, the difference in penalties between the products where the defect violated
specific expectations and those products where the defect did not varied between
$991 and $2827 (gas caps were smallest). The differences were statistically
significant at conventional levels for all products except gas caps. 169 Also

167. An estimate is statistically significant at a given level if the probability of observing
an effect as large as the effect observed in a sample would be less than the significance level
if no true effect existed. JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 133–35 (4th ed. 2009). The level at which a given estimate would be
significant is called a “p-value.” An estimate is generally considered strongly significant if
𝑝 < 0.01, significant if 𝑝 < 0.05, and weakly significant if 𝑝 < 0.10.
168. 𝑝 < 0.01 for seatbelts.
169. 𝑝 < 0.10 for airbags, 𝑝 < 0.05 for autopilot and air conditioning.
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noteworthy, subjects were very likely to assign a nonzero penalty in all
circumstances, with 95% choosing a positive penalty.170
These larger penalties demonstrate that consumers view violations of specific
expectations as more deserving of punishment than other defects. The reason is likely
twofold. First, as explored in greater depth in Part II, specific expectations are the
class of consumer expectations which are most likely to be clearly defined and
articulated. When a product fails and causes harm along a dimension that the product
was intended to reduce risk on instead, consumers immediately experience a loss
relative to their expectations.171 But beyond that greater loss, consumers also likely
experience significant negative emotions in response to product defects that are
contrary to specific expectations. The next Section provides our results that examine
whether consumers exhibited such emotions and whether more negative evaluations
of companies drove higher penalties.
2. Manufacturer Evaluations
Our experiment examined the effect of violations of specific expectations on three
different dimensions. Subjects were asked to evaluate whether they believed the
defect that affected products was severe, whether the defect affected too many cars,
and whether the manufacturer took insufficient action to prevent the defect. Figures
5, 6, and 7 provide average subject responses to each of these evaluations. While we
asked consumers whether they strongly disagree, disagree, are neutral, agree, or
strongly agree with the statements, our figures present the proportion of subjects who
strongly agree with the statement. The results are presented in this binary fashion
because they involve a meaningful quantitative metric and are easier to interpret. 172

170. There are several possibilities for why our subjects almost universally chose a nonzero
penalty. Subjects could have thought the $1000 compensatory measure would not actually be
sufficient to compensate consumers. Alternatively, subjects could have sought a greater-thancompensatory fine to ensure that the manufacturer would be deterred in the future.
171. Cf. Andrew D. Gershoff & Jonathan J. Koehler, Safety First? The Role of Emotion in
Safety Product Betrayal Aversion, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 140 (2011) (discussing the role of
betrayal aversion in product safety defect preferences).
172. The results are consistent if we instead separately analyze responses to each point on
the five-point scale.
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Figure 5: Percent of Respondents Who Agreed Defect Was Severe

Note: N = 640 for all products, N = 128 for individual products. Brackets indicate the 95%
confidence interval for the proportion of subjects strongly agreeing that the defect was severe.

Figure 6: Percent of Respondents Who Agreed Defect Affected Too Many Cars

Note: N = 640 for all products, N = 128 for individual products. Brackets indicate the 95%
confidence interval for the proportion of subjects strongly agreeing that the defect affected too
many cars.
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Figure 7: Percent of Respondents Who Agreed Manufacturer Took Insufficient
Action to Prevent Defect

Note: N = 640 for all products, N = 128 for individual products. Brackets indicate the 95%
confidence interval for the proportion of subjects strongly agreeing that the manufacturer took
insufficient action to prevent the defect.

The experimental results provide strong and consistent evidence that consumers
are averse to violations of specific expectations. Figure 5’s results for all products
demonstrate that subjects considering a product which violated specific expectations
were twenty percentage points more likely to agree that the defect was severe. 173
Figure 6 and Figure 7 similarly demonstrate that respondents were thirteen and
twelve percentage points more likely to agree or strongly agree that the company
took insufficient action to prevent the defect and that the defect affected too many
vehicles, respectively.174 These differences persisted even though the text of the
experiment survey clearly articulated information that was consistent across the
treatment and control groups about the level of harm that each defect caused, the
action taken to prevent the defect, and the number of vehicles that each defect
affected.175
Subject evaluations differed substantially by product type. The difference
between the violation and non-violation conditions was never significant for air
conditioning and was only significant in the severity question for gas caps. Subjects
were more likely to strongly agree with the statements in the seatbelt, airbag, and
autopilot scenarios than the air conditioning or gas cap conditions. Thus, our subjects

173. 𝑝 < 0.01.
174. 𝑝 < 0.01 for both differences.
175. See supra Section III.A.
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were particularly critical of the defects on products that were intended to promote
safety even when the defect did not increase risks of injury. But, the effect of specific
expectations remains separately significant even though subjects display an aversion
to safety product defects. These results demonstrate that the violation of specific
expectations provokes moral outrage.176
3. Product Choice
The final results from our experiment demonstrate that the outrage and desire to
punish that our subjects demonstrated are the result of violated expectations that
products will perform as intended, rather than an aversion to any defect, expected or
not. The distinction is critical—if consumers fail to change their consumption in the
face of expected defects, either version of the consumer expectation test will not
enable consumers to determine the appropriate version of risks in the market. If
consumers treat risky products the same when they expect the risk, regardless of
whether the defect relates to the product’s intended function or some other
dimension, it indicates that the asymmetry identified in the first part of the
experiment results does not compromise consumers’ ability to choose products in the
face of full information.
Figure 8 presents our results for each of the product choice questions. Each panel
demonstrates the proportion of subjects who chose the risky product in our product
choice scenario. If subjects were simply averse to products that performed opposite
their intended function regardless of expectations, Figure 8 would demonstrate a
statistically significant difference between the rates at which subjects chose products
when defects were contrary to the proper purpose of a product and when they were
not. However, the results provide substantial evidence that our experiential subjects
were indifferent between defects contrary to the product’s purpose and defects
unrelated to the product’s purpose.

176. We also investigated whether the moral outrage that our results indicated is the
mechanism through which violations of specific expectations cause an increase in the fine that
subjects sought to levy upon firms. See generally David P. MacKinnon, Amanda J. Fairchild
& Matthew S. Fritz, Mediation Analysis, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 593 (2007) (discussing the
goals and mechanics of mediation analysis). The results of our mediation analysis demonstrate
that the evaluative responses mediate most, but not all, of the effect of violations of specific
expectations. Of the approximately $1700 higher fine assigned to firms that manufacture
products which violate specific expectations, 55.5% is explained by the increased negative
emotions. The increase in perceived severity of the defect accounts for 75.2% of that 55.5%.
These results incidentally indicate that NHTSA’s framework for assessing regulatory penalties
is likely consistent with consumer preferences for punishing violations of specific consumer
expectations.
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Figure 8: Percent of Respondents Who Chose the Risky Product

Note: N = 640 for all products, N = 128 for individual products. Brackets indicate the 95%
confidence interval for the proportion of subjects who chose the risky product.

When comparing either all products together or each product separately, the
results demonstrate that subjects chose the risky product at statistically
indistinguishable rates across the two conditions. Subjects considering a product with
a defect unrelated to the product’s purpose chose the risky product 43.5% of the time,
while subjects considering a product with a defect that would have caused the product
to serve the opposite of its intended purpose 40.1% of the time, which was not a
statistically significant difference. Subjects were most willing to choose the risky
product when considering air conditioning and least willing to do so in the seatbelt
condition.
In conjunction with the results for consumer attitudes toward penalties, these
findings imply that on a prospective basis consumers are not as deterred by the
possibility of defects as they are after the defects are manifested. Once the product
fails with respect to a dimension for which the product was purported to provide a
benefit, there is widespread sentiment that the product has violated one or more of
the key governmental criteria for justifying regulatory penalties and that the level of
the sanctions should be greater than for defects that do not violate consumer
expectations. This discrepancy between consumers’ ex post sentiments and their ex
ante preferences provides an additional role for products liability in that even if the
risk of product failures were known in advance, market forces alone would not fully
reflect the harms that consumers believe they have suffered once specific
expectations have been violated.
As shown in Sections III.B.1 and III.B.2 above, our subjects did exhibit a
statistically significant response to the exact same defects when asked to levy
punishments and evaluate manufacturers. Moreover, subjects had differential risk
tolerance across products, indicating that they saw the product choices as more than
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interchangeable financial lotteries. For example, subjects chose a risky gas cap
51.6% of the time, while they chose a risky seatbelt only 30.5% of the time. Further,
consistent with possible risk aversion, subjects chose the safe product more often
than the risky product. Across all scenarios, subjects chose the risky product only
41.8% of the time. Finally, as reviewed in the experiment design section, subjects
rationally responded to financial incentives in our experiment, demonstrating that
they seriously engaged with each question and the various scenarios.
CONCLUSION
Product defects can kill or permanently disable consumers and liability lawsuits
can cost firms hundreds of millions of dollars,177 yet this critical area of the law lacks
clarity. The two legal tests that currently prevail, the consumer expectations test and
the risk-utility test, are hard to apply and lead to outcomes that are difficult to predict.
As a result, firms are more likely to avoid investing resources in making products
safer and will instead accept damages as a cost of doing business. Such an outcome
does not serve the consumers who expect safer products, nor does it serve the firms
who would be incentivized to comply with the law if it operated in a predictable and
efficient fashion.
This Article has argued that a test based on consumer expectations is not
irreparably flawed but should be reframed; by adopting our specific consumer
expectations test, many of the theoretical benefits of the consumer expectations test
can be retained without creating the morass that persists under the current test. Our
specific consumer expectations test holds firms liable if they produce a product that
consumers expect would reduce a risk, but actually causes the risk to increase. The
test is equally applicable in the case of a product intended to create a benefit, but
which actually harms the consumer on that dimension. Because the test only requires
plaintiffs to establish the direction of a change in risk rather than identify the
magnitude with particularity, and the test only applies in cases where expectations
are clearly salient, the test avoids the ambiguity of the traditional consumer
expectations tests and is less costly to apply. As a result, its outcomes are clear and
predictable, incentivizing firms to produce products that do not increase the risk that
consumers face.
The specific consumer expectations test not only yields appropriate incentives,
but is consistent with the way that consumers actually consider defective products
and how consumers would prefer to punish firms that produce defective products.
Our novel experiment demonstrated that when consumers possess information about
risks ex ante, they do not distinguish between defects that are contrary to a product’s
primary purpose and those that are unrelated to the purpose of the product. But when
individuals learn that a product defect that violated specific expectations has
occurred, they punish such violations more harshly and view them as more

177. E.g., Judgment on Jury Verdict at 6–7, Johnson v. Monsanto Co., No. CGC16550128,
2018 WL 4261442 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2018) (awarding the plaintiff $289,253,209.32 in
damages for producing an herbicide which caused cancer). See generally Benjamin J.
McMichael & W. Kip Viscusi, Taming Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 2019 U. ILL.
L. REV. 171, 193–97(2019) (cataloguing more than one hundred punitive damage awards over
$100 million dollars including several defective product cases).
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condemnable. Because jurors, sitting as the finders of fact, often make the critical
determination in products liability cases, fashioning the law to produce consistent
and efficient outcomes conditional on such preferences is critical. Unlike either of
the prevailing tests, our specific expectations test is consistent with the way that
individuals actually consider defective products.
The specific consumer expectations test provides a way out for courts that
recognize the problems associated with the consumer expectations test. By first
considering whether consumers have clearly identifiable expectations over a
particular product component, the test avoids the pitfalls of the traditional consumer
expectations test. In cases where the test does not apply, the risk-utility test provides
incentives for firms to minimize social losses due to accidents. This approach is a
substantial advance for the jurisprudence of products liability law, contributing to its
primary goals of promoting consumer welfare and minimizing costs.
APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics

Variables
Subject characteristics
Female
White
Natural science major
Car owner
Always wears seatbelt
Current smoker
Observations

Full sample
0.523
(0.500)
0.758
(0.429)
0.219
(0.414)
0.461
(0.499)
0.883
(0.322)
0.070
(0.256)
128

